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Is Deal or No Deal Cheating Its 
Contestants?
As fans of fair contests, we are lead to believe that game shows proceed with mathematical consistency. 
However, a slight anomaly in this basic assumption can be found while watching the game play of Deal or No 
Deal.  During certain situations it seems like the show is cheating its contestants.  Could any mathematician 
let this question go without further analysis?  Of course not!  So began an investigation into our hypothesis. 
Using simple statistical notions like expected value and linear regression, we show how to isolate this math-
ematical irregularity and provide some evidence of its existence.  What does this mean?  Is foul play afoot? 
Read on to fi nd out.
Introduction
In December 2005 a new prime time 
game show debuted on TV.  Titled Deal or 
No Deal, the contest with mathematical 
implications soon piqued my interests.  After 
a few viewings, I noticed a fairly dependable 
pattern in the game play.  However, I soon 
witnessed an episode that seemed to deviate 
greatly from this path.  How could a contest 
with thousands of dollars at stake, rooted in 
a gambling scenario, be allowed to proceed 
if it lacked mathematical consistency?  In a 
sense, it seemed that the show was “cheating” 
its contestants.  Eventually my intrigue got 
the better of me and I decided to test my 
preliminary observations.  What follows are 
the results.
Game play and Hypothesis
First of all, I need to set up the format of 
the game.  For my data set I analyzed the 
syndicated 30-minute version of the original 
show.  In short, Deal or No Deal off ers the 
opportunity for contestants to win up to 
$500,000.  Before the actual show begins, 
each of 22 briefcases is randomly assigned a 
unique amount of money ranging from $0.01 
to $500,000 by a third party organization 
(otherwise uninvolved in the game play). 
Th en, with the cameras rolling, the contestant 
chooses one of the 22 cases but is not allowed 
to open it.  Th e amount within will be his 
prize should he refuse all off ers by the Banker 
to buy the case.  
What follows next is a series of rounds 
where the contestant chooses to open a 
predetermined number of cases in play, 
revealing monetary amounts that are then 
taken out of play.  At the end of each 
round, the Banker makes an off er to buy 
the contestant’s case based (somehow) on 
the average of the values still known to be in 
play (the expected value of the game at that 
point).  Th e contestant then chooses to take 
the deal or continue to the next round.  
Under this format there are 7 possible 
rounds the contestant can play, with 7 off ers 
he can accept or decline.  Contestants can 
only make a deal after opening the specifi ed 
number of cases.  Th ey cannot deal mid-
round.  If a contestant takes an off er, the 
game is offi  cially over.  If a contestant refuses 
all off ers, he wins the money in the case.  Th e 
monetary distributions and round formats 
are listed in Tables 1 and 2.
If the contestant makes a deal before 
round 7, the game is usually played out in 
the hypothetical.  Th at is, they play out the 
remaining rounds, complete with off ers, as if 
the game were not over.  Table 3 lists a quick 
example of an actual game with fi ve offi  cial 
bank off ers and two hypothetical ones.
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I wanted 
to know 
which of 
two possible 
situations 
was 
occurring: 
Were my 
calculations 
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was playing 
fair all along, 
or were my 
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correct 
and the 
banker was 
“fudging the 
numbers?”
It was in these hypothetical situations like 
rounds 6 and 7 from Table 3 that I noticed 
a discrepancy with the competition.  During 
the rounds of games still in play, quick 
calculations showed the Banker off ering 
contestants far below their expected value.  In 
the hypothetical rounds, however, preliminary 
observations revealed the off ers to be near, or 
even above, these similar expected values.  
Being a student of mathematics, I wanted 
to know which of two possible situations was 
occurring:  Were my calculations wrong and 
the Banker was playing fair all along, or were 
my calculations correct and the banker was 
“fudging the numbers?”
Data and Testing
Over the course of three months I recorded 
the round by round results of 75 games. 
First, I split the data into the two situations 
to be tested; offi  cial off ers to contestants still 
playing the game vs. hypothetical off ers to 
contestants who had taken a deal at the end 
of the previous round or earlier.  
Since contestants with large amounts of 
money in play would obviously get larger 
off ers than contestants with only small 
amounts of money remaining (offi  cial or 
not), I could not simply compare the values 
of the off ers by the banker.  Instead, I had 
to consider these off ers as a percent of the 
expected value (EV) of the game’s outcome. 
Th is would give me a value independent of 
whether the contestant was having a “lucky 
day” or not.  If the Banker is “playing fair,” 
the means of these percentages should hold 
on a round by round basis across the offi  cial 
and hypothetical cases.  Figure 1 illustrates 
0.01 1 5 10 25 50 100 200 300 400 500
1000 2500 5000 7500 10000 25000 50000 75000 100000 250000 500000
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
# Cases to Open 5 5 4 2 2 1 1
Table 1 Monetary Amounts
Table 2 Round Formats
Round
Cases Opened 
($ Values 
Removed)
Expected 
Value (Ave. $ 
Remaining)
Offer for case 
($)
Offer as a % of 
Expected Value Result
1 1, 10, 2500, 50000, 100000 51,475 13,000 25.25 Denied
2 25, 50, 1000, 7500, 250000 51,375 15,000 29.20 Denied
3 5, 200, 400, 25000 73,863 28,000 37.91 Denied
4 10000, 500000 13,483 6,000 44.50 Denied
5 0.01, 500 20,100 13,000 64.68 Accepted
6 100 26,767 27,000 100.87 N/A
7 5000 37,650 39,000 103.59 N/A
Last Case 75000 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Contestant’s 
Case 300 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Table 3 Deal or No Deal
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could I 
consider all 
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this round and 
turn it into 
a predictive  
measurement 
of the Banker’s 
offers?
Fig 1 Average percent of the expected value (%EV) offered by round
these averages across this splitting.
Beginning at the end of round 4 (as no 
contestant took an off er before round 3), an 
obvious split in the mean off er is revealed. 
Considering round 6 in Figure 1, contestants 
still playing the game receive off ers from 
the Banker that average about 76% of their 
expected value, while those contestants 
playing hypothetically are told the off er would 
have been close to 96% of that same expected 
value.  Th is 20 percentage point diff erence 
seems to suggest the Banker does not follow 
the same set of rules for making off ers when 
the game is still active versus when it is not. 
While providing exciting evidence in support 
of my conjecture, one test statistic is hardly 
proof.  To get more substance behind my 
hypothesis, I had to dig deeper into the data. 
While consulting the data more closely, 
I decided I could turn my focus to one 
particular round of the contest instead of 
the game as a whole.  Round 5 seemed to 
hold the most potential, having the greatest 
discrepancy across the two situations, but 
there were not enough data points to draw 
sound conclusions.  My set of recordings 
contributed only 18 examples of hypothetical 
off ers at the end of this round. Generally, in a 
nod to the Law of Large Numbers, we like to 
have at least 30 data points before considering 
a test statistic meaningful.  Luckily, the split 
in Round 6 meets this qualifi cation.  With 30 
hypothetical off ers and 37 actual off ers (out of 
75 recordings, where the remaining 8 games 
did not even bother playing out to round 6), 
I had my round chosen to investigate.  To 
verify that the means computed earlier were 
not being skewed by a few extreme values, a 
box plot (Figure 2) seemed like the best place 
to begin.
Two observations can be made from Figure 
2.  First, I saw more evidence in support of 
my earlier calculations.  Both the hypothetical 
and offi  cial off ers are fairly well clustered 
around their averages.  If anything, the mean 
of the fake off ers may be an underestimate 
based on a few low values, one of which is 
an outlier.  I will address this point later. 
Th e second consequence of this plot is that 
it urged me to move forward with one more 
test.  In particular, could I consider all the data 
from this round and turn it into a predictive 
measurement of the Banker’s off ers?
A great tool to accomplish this feat is 
regression.  Since intuition suggests the 
Banker’s off ers should increase linearly with 
the expected values of the contestants, I 
decided a linear model would be the place to 
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By graphing 
the expected 
value of the 
games along 
the x-axis 
against the 
corresponding 
Banker’s 
offers along 
the y-axis, 
performing 
linear regression 
found the 
equation of the 
line that “best 
fi ts” the data. 
start.  By graphing the expected value of the games along the x-axis against the corresponding 
Banker’s off ers along the y-axis, performing linear regression found the equation of the line 
that “best fi ts” the data.  In this case, such a model would provide me with a more analytical 
measurement of how the Banker arrives at his off ers.  Th e results of round 6 can be seen in 
Figures 3 and 4.
Fig 2 Box and whisker plot of percentage of expected value for round 6 offers
Fig 3 Round 6 offi cial offers
Fig 4 Round 6 predicted offers
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There is strong 
evidence the 
Banker breaks 
from his 
formula for 
computing 
deals 
(whatever it 
is) during the 
hypothetical 
rounds of 
the game.  Is 
the banker 
cheating these 
contestants 
with infl ated 
offers?  It’s 
hard to say.  
Fig 5 New model for hypothetical
For contestants still in the game in round 
6 we get a linear model with a slope of .6511. 
Th is corresponds to a prediction that the 
Banker would make off ers around 65.11% 
of expected value.  With an R-Squared value 
near 0.94 (remember, the closer to 1.00 the 
better), I had a fair amount of confi dence in 
this model.
For contestants only hypothetically playing 
the game in round 6 we see a predicted off er of 
90.57% of expected value, a drastic increase 
from the earlier situation.  However, I had a 
bit of concern with a drop in the R-Squared 
value to 0.916.  Why did this happen?  
Notice how one data point in Figure 
4 (highlighted in black) is sitting a good 
distance below the trend line.  Testing 
against twice the standard deviation of the 
data, I found this occurrence to be the same 
outlier identifi ed earlier.  What could have 
happened to cause this?  Maybe the Banker 
miscalculated, maybe he had a personal 
vendetta against that particular contestant, or 
maybe he was trying to keep a little of the 
money for himself. I couldn’t be sure.  
In any event I had to decide what to do 
about the point.  Now, removal of an outlier 
is still controversial in many mathematical 
circles, but I decided to proceed with this 
option in the interest of the investigation. 
Considering the adjusted data (with the 
outlier removed), the slope of the recalculated 
trend line becomes 0.9421, or a prediction of 
off ers being above 94% expected value, with 
an R Squared value of 0.9595.  Th is new 
model for hypothetical off ers is displayed 
in Figure 5, along with the graph of offi  cial 
off ers for comparison.  
With this fi nal picture the situation 
becomes fairly clear.  How can the game have 
such drastically diff erent trends across these 
two situations without a slight change in the 
rules? 
Conclusions
Considering all this information, there is 
strong evidence the Banker breaks from his 
formula for computing deals (whatever it is) 
during the hypothetical rounds of the game. 
He seems to be off ering more money than 
he would have if the contestants were still 
actually playing and able to accept the cash. 
What does this mean?  Is the banker cheating 
these contestants with infl ated off ers?  It’s 
hard to say.  
Since this discrepancy occurs after the 
game is offi  cially over, the term “cheating” 
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may not even apply.  In fact, the show itself 
broadcasts the line “Portions of this program 
not aff ecting the outcome of the competition 
have been edited/recreated” while the fi nal 
credits role.  Th is may not be an admission 
of guilt, but it defi nitely implies the situation 
painted above could exist.  
In the end, it only makes sense that the 
Banker would make larger off ers after the 
game play is over, if only to increase the 
drama for those watching at home.  Perhaps 
cheating is too strong of a word, but is it fair 
for the contestant to think they lost out on 
one amount of money when they really did 
not?  Should it be changed?  I’ll leave that 
answer to the reader.  Until then, at least, I 
know I will be taking all hypothetical off ers 
with a grain of salt.
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